In the last decade, China's trade with Africa increased faster than its overall foreign trade. This article focusses on the role of real exchange rates in this growth. A 'bilateral real exchange rate' augmented trade gravity model applied to China's trade with 49 African countries over the period [2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011] shows that the real appreciation of most African currencies relative to the renminbi favoured China's exports to these countries, but had no impact on China's imports from Africa. This real appreciation of African currencies is explained by three main factors: the decision to peg them to other currencies (in particular to the euro), the amount of export of raw materials from African countries and the amount of financial assistance from international donors including China. Thus, a kind of detrimental sequence exists in Africa's relationship with China: China's imports of raw materials and its economic co-operation are among the factors explaining the appreciation of African real exchange rates, which itself stimulates China's exports of manufactured goods, and so restricts Africa's own industrial development.
Introduction
Since the 'open door' policy was launched in 1978, China has made big efforts around the world to secure the raw materials needed to sustain its high growth rate and to diversify its exports. This effort accelerated from 1999 when China adopted the 'go out' policy. As part of this policy, China turned to Africa following the first China/Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000. Since then China's trade with Africa has intensified: beginning at a very low level, it has increased at a higher rate than that of China's total trade. The rapid growth of China's imports from Africa is an immediate source of economic growth for Africa; however in the long term, since China's imports are accompanied by a nearly equivalent amount of exports of Sudan are the three most important partners. In 2011, Zambia and Democratic Republic of Congo were among the significant Chinese import partners; Burkina Faso, Malawi, Gambia, Eritrea, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe became new partners. It appears that China has difficulty in gaining access to the principal oil-producing Sub-Saharan countries, which export to developed countries. China trades more intensively with Sub-Saharan African countries than with North African ones because of the nature of its imports.
Nature of exported and imported goods
Always according to UN UNCTADstat, China's imports from Africa are dominated by raw materials (94% of the total in 2011), principally petroleum (64%) and ores and metal (26%). China's exports to Africa are dominated by manufactured goods (93% of the total in 2011), principally machinery and transport equipment (48%), followed by textiles and clothing (13%). The structure of trade between China and Africa corresponds closely to the conventional trade model of comparative advantage.
The changes in China's real effective exchange rate relative to African currencies
We now consider the development of China's trade with Africa and the changes in the real exchange rate between China and African countries. 4 Since 1980, China has practised a very active exchange rate policy, which was marked by a big real depreciation relative to its 4 The real exchange rates, bilateral or effective, are calculated using consumer prices (which are obtained from International Financial Statistics, IMF) which are the only data available for all African countries.
main trade partners from 1980 to 1993, and, on average, a real appreciation from 1994 to 2011 (see Guillaumont Jeanneney and Hua, 2011) . However, in the last decade, the change in the Chinese real effective exchange rate relative to the currencies of African countries has been different from that relative to the currencies of the rest of the world. After an appreciation in 2001 of 2.8% relative to African currencies and 4.3% relative to its main trade partners' currencies in the rest of the world, the Chinese real effective exchange rate relative to African countries depreciated more strongly than relative to the rest of the world (respectively, by 27 and 12% over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . 5 Then, from 2006 to 2011, the Chinese real effective exchange rate relative to African countries depreciated by a further 6% while that relative to the rest of the world appreciated by 22%. Consequently, during the total period of our analysis, from 2000 to 2011, the renminbi depreciated by 29% relative to African trade partners in real terms, while it appreciated by 13% relative to the rest of the world. Conversely, on average, African currencies appreciated in real terms by 42% relative to the renminbi, and by 51% for the Sub-Saharan African countries. During the same period, the currencies of China's main trade partners in the rest of the world depreciated by 11% relative to the renminbi ( Figure 2 ). 5 Real effective exchange rates are averages of real bilateral exchange rates. They may be calculated versus main trade partners of China or only versus African countries. If calculated with reference to main trade partners, the bilateral exchange rates are weighted by the share of China's exports to and imports from each trade partner in its total exports and imports with respect to its main partners; if calculated with reference to African countries, they are weighted by the share of China's exports to and imports from African countries in the total of its exports and imports with Africa.
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The changes in the real effective exchange rate of China relative to Africa hide a wide diversity in the changes in real bilateral exchange rates ( Figure 3 ). The currencies of 35 African countries appreciated in real terms relative to the renminbi, while those of 16 African countries depreciated; 6 the two extreme annual variations are the real appreciation of the kwanza of Angola by 10% and the real depreciation of the franc of Democratic Republic of Congo by 6%. It is worth noting that the countries that experienced an appreciation of their real exchange rates relative to China are all Sub-Saharan countries and are the 15 African countries which had the biggest Chinese share of their exports and imports in 2011 (Table 1) . It is likely that these changes in the bilateral exchange rates between African countries and China have affected China's trade with African countries in different ways. This point is reinforced by Figure 4 , which represents the statistical relationship between trade and the real bilateral exchange rates of African countries relative to China. It shows that the real appreciation of African currencies seems to significantly increase China's exports to Africa, but seems to have little effect on China's imports from Africa. It thus appears that the geographical diversification of China's exports to Africa, contrary to its imports from Africa, may be partially explained by the changes in the real exchange rates of African countries.
3. Impact of real bilateral exchange rates on the trade between China and Africa
The theoretical basis
To understand the bilateral trade between China and Africa, it is useful to refer to gravity models that have the advantage of taking trade transaction costs into account (for a literature review, see Anderson, 2011) . However, it is also necessary to extend the model by adding real 6 Libya and Somalia are excluded because of non-availability of data. exchange rates to the independent variables used, as it is used in traditional trade models to estimate aggregate trade (Goldstein and Khan, 1985) . This extension of the model was proposed by Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil (2003) and Kwack et al. (2007) for China's trade with Asian and developed countries.
According to traditional trade theory, the aggregate export supply of a country depends on its potential supply and the ratio of its export price to foreign prices for alternative tradable goods. In the same way, the total import demand of a country depends on its potential demand [measured by gross domestic product (GDP)] and the ratio of the import price relative to the price of domestically produced alternative tradable goods. In this model, exporting countries are assumed to be 'price maker', because the price of tradable goods is not the same in all countries because of imperfect competition. For China's exports of manufactured goods, this assumption is plausible. However, it is not the same for China's imports of raw materials ( petroleum and ore). The raw material prices are fixed on international markets and African countries are 'price takers'. The changes in the real exchange rates affect only the domestic costs of extraction relative to the international prices, and therefore, the incitement to produce and to export but only marginally. As Figure 2 shows, we can assume that changes in the real exchange rates will have a smaller impact on African exports to China than on African imports from China, or even no impact at all on African exports.
We add the variable of relative price between trading countries to the traditional independent variables of gravity models to explain bilateral trade. The exports of a country i to a country j are represented by X ij (which is symmetrical to the imports of the country j from country i, M ji ). X ij depends on Y i , and Y j (which determine the capacity of the exporting country to produce and the potential demand of the importing country), on transaction costs ðτ ij Þ; on measures facilitating trade ðρ ij Þ between the two countries and on the relative price of tradable goods in the two countries (expressed in the same currency), in effect their bilateral real exchange rate ER ij . ER ij ¼ EN ij Ã P j =P i ; where EN ij is the nominal bilateral exchange rate between i and j, or the value of the currency of country j expressed in the currency of country i. P i is the price of goods in exporting countries and P j in importing countries. The bilateral trade equation can be written as follows: 
Econometric estimation
The estimation of the above equations is made in logarithms so that
and
Three disturbance terms (unobserved individual effects fixed over time, temporal effects and error terms) are added into equations (2) and (3) to be estimated empirically. The estimations with and without fixed effects and time effects are made to compare the results. China's GDP is dropped down once time trend is included because it does not vary between African countries and its effect is captured by time-fixed effects.
In traditional gravity models, the transaction costs are generally approximated by the distance between each pair of trading countries; in our estimation, they are also assumed to depend on whether a country is landlocked or not, and on the quality of institutions. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) suggested that bad governance increases transaction costs and is detrimental to external trade; this assumption was applied with success by De Grauwe et al. (2012) to the trade between China and Africa. We use the same assumption. The actions that facilitate trade are seen in China's special economic zones (SEZ) in Africa, which have the objective of developing manufacturing activities in African countries (see Bräutigam and Tang, 2011) , and may reduce the imports of manufactured goods by African countries from China, or may even permit some exports. The trade facilitation 7 The quality of infrastructure is also used in trade gravity models. We included in the estimations the African transport index (issued by the African Development Bank), and the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants reported by World Bank World Development Indicator, but the results are not statistically significant.
actions are also seen in China's economic co-operation and direct investments in Africa, as shown by Biggeri and Sanfilippo (2009) . China's economic co-operation in Africa mainly concerns infrastructure projects covered by an agreement between a Chinese firm and an African country. This economic co-operation has increased a lot recently with China now winning 25% of World Bank construction project bids, 50% of the contracts financed by the African Bank of Development (see Brautigam (2011) ) and all of the projects financed by the Chinese government 8 . Economic co-operation facilitates the exports of machinery and transport equipment needed for the infrastructure projects. In 2010, these exports represented 43% of China's total exports to Africa. Concerning China's direct investments, they aim to secure access to overseas energy resources and raw materials (Asche and Schüller, 2008; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009 ; among others). 9 China's economic co-operation is introduced into the export equation, and its direct investments in African countries are introduced into the import equation.
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The econometric analysis of China's exports is applied to the panel data for 49 African countries over the period 2000-2011. Libya, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia and Zimbabwe are excluded because of lack of data. The period studied begins in 2000 because that year marked the launch of the first China/Africa Cooperation Forum, and the beginning of China's exports towards four new countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland). Data are available for several African countries only from 2000. With respect to the econometric analysis of China's imports, the period of estimation is shortened to 2003-2011, because China published the data on foreign direct investment only for this period; also the sample is reduced by 2-47 countries as China does not invest in Burkina Faso and Swaziland. The sample is unbalanced, with some countries having more observations than others for some variables. The means and standard deviations of the variables are provided in Table 2 , and their definitions and sources are given in Appendix Table A1 .
Three econometric methods of panel data analysis are applied to control for unobservable individual heterogeneity 11 (Wooldridge, 2002; Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2005) . The fixed effects' model uses within estimator and deals with individual specific effects across African countries by including a dummy variable for each country, but has the weakness that the time-invariant independent variables (such as distance or landlocked countries) are lost from the estimation. The random effects model permits keeping the time-invariant variables in the independent 8 China's foreign economic co-operation is not an outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) activity, because Chinese contractors neither risk their own equity capital nor control any foreign affiliate (World Bank, 2008) . It is an agreement between a Chinese contractor and a host government, which assigns to the contractor the responsibility to undertake a project and to secure the required capital against the management rights and the resulting profits for a pre-determined period before transferring the rights to the host government (Cheung et al., 2012) . 9 In the literature it is argued that regional trade agreements may have an impact on trade (e.g., Carrère, 2004) . We estimated the effects of five African trade agreements and the African trade agreements with European countries and the USA, which might curb China/Africa trade. However, the results are not statistically significant and are not reported in the table of results. 10 It might be possible that China's direct investments increase its exports to African countries and that its economic co-operation increases China's imports. We have tested this assumption, but the results are not statistically significant. 11 The results of the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (P = 0.0000) show the presence of individual-specific effects across African countries. variables. Because it captures the individual heterogeneity in error terms, it creates a strong assumption, contrary to the fixed effects estimator, that individual effects are not correlated to the independent variables. The Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator overcomes these drawbacks by instrumenting the endogenous variables in a random effects model. In the present estimation, several variables are suspected to be endogenous: real bilateral exchange rate, real GDP of African countries, China's economic co-operation and direct investments, but not the governance of African countries, distance from China or landlocked countries.
Econometric tests and results
Before making the econometric regressions of the equations, we need to know if the variables are stationary at an absolute level to avoid fallacious results. Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) panel data unit-root tests are thus applied in which time trend and panel-specific means (fixed effects) options are used; the variables are lagged one period. The mean of the series across panels is subtracted from the series to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional dependence (Levin et al., 2002) . The results reported in Appendix Table A3 allow us to reject the null hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit root. Thus, we can accept the alternative hypothesis that the variables are stationary at an absolute level. Therefore, the estimations of the equations are not spurious.
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The econometric results of the three methods are presented in Table 3A and B, successively for China's exports and China's imports. The results of the three econometric methods are very similar. The comments are focussed on the results of the Hausman-Taylor model with time-fixed and country-fixed effects. Concerning the exports equation, it appears that the gravity variables are statistically significant and conform to the expected results. A 1% increase in an African country's GDP leads to an increase in China's exports to this country of 0.86%. 13 Good governance of African countries has a positive effect on China's exports.
China's economic co-operation in Africa promotes its exports. The SEZs created by China in Africa to transmit its experience, and to help African countries to develop their industries, decrease its exports to Africa. The fact of being landlocked African countries decreases China's exports. The distance separating China and African countries has a negative sign, but is not statistically significant. This distance is probably not significant, because as the present estimations are only focussed on the bilateral trade between China and Africa, the differences in distance between the various African countries and China are small. The dummy variable for landlocked countries captures the relative higher cost of transport and communication for these countries. As expected, the real appreciation of the African currencies exerts a positive effect on China's exports with the estimated coefficient of 0.29 (column 6). Not only is this coefficient significant, but also the elasticity value shows that the results are economically relevant. During the period 2000-2011, thanks to a real appreciation of African currencies of 4.2%
12 Thus, we cannot use the vector error correction model to capture the dynamic effects of real exchange rates. To try to capture the last, we introduced real exchange rate lagged one period, but it is insignificant in all estimations. The results are not reported in the tables. 13 The results of the Hausman test (P = 0.8488) do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis: difference in coefficients of fixed effects and random effects are not systematic. The results for time-fixed effect (P = 0.0000) show that the null hypothesis (all years coefficients are jointly equal to zero) can be rejected. 
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Determinants of real bilateral exchange rates between African countries and China
Theoretical basis
We now look at the real appreciation of most African currencies relative to the renminbi described previously. Since the pioneering book by Edwards (1989) many articles have been published about the determinants of real effective exchange rates. Sebastian Edwards made a distinction between the long-run factors, which determine an equilibrium exchange rate, and the short-run factors, which lead to a movement from the equilibrium exchange rate. The long-run factors, often called the 'fundamentals', are the relative level of GDP per capita (due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect), and the structural determinants of the balance of payments, notably the international terms of trade and the financial balance. It has been widely documented that an increase in external resources due to a big expansion of exports of raw materials, or of net capital inflows, can induce an increase in the demand for nontradable goods (which cannot be imported), thus leading to a real appreciation of the exchange rate. The short-run factors are the macroeconomic policies, principally the nominal exchange rate policy and domestic or foreign monetary shocks. The real exchange rates of African countries relative to China depend on the same factors as relative to the rest of the world, but also on the relative exchange rate policies chosen by African countries (see Appendix Table A2) , and by China, and even those practised in the USA and the euro countries. It is worth noting that many African countries have pegged 14 The results of the Hausman test (P = 0.0017) and time-fixed effect test (P = 0.0145) show that the null hypothesis can be rejected.
their currency to the euro (without devaluing during the last decade). The renminbi is de facto pegged to the dollar (with the hard pegging periods from 2000 to 2004, and since then some revaluations). The euro appreciated relative to the dollar by 35% during the hard pegging periods of the RMB which was maintained stable relative to the US$ (8.28 yuans per $), and it continued to appreciate in the second period from 2005 to 2011, but at a less level than the renminbi appreciation. In total, the Euro appreciated by 51% versus the dollar over the period 2000-2011; and during the same period, the renminbi appreciated only by 28% relative to the dollar ( Figure 5) All these countries experienced a small real depreciation or stability except for Angola and Eritrea, which met big appreciations. In the cases of the three countries (Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia) which peg their currencies to the rand of South Africa (whose rate of exchange versus the dollar is floating and relatively stable), their currencies appreciated moderately.
Finally, for those countries that have adopted a managed floating or crawling peg during all the studied period, the real bilateral exchange rates relative to China have depreciated or have been stable. There are some exceptions-Angola and Zimbabwe (which have experienced hyperinflation, 16 due to inflationary fiscal and monetary policies), 17 and Nigeria, Sudan and Zambia (which have suffered from the 'Dutch disease' phenomenon and significant inflation episodes; see below). Thus, in addition to the variables that explain the bilateral real exchange rates of African currencies relative to the renminbi, we introduce two dummy variables of exchange rate regimes, respectively, representing the currencies pegged to the euro, and the currencies pegged to the US dollar or the South-African rand. The residual category is composed of managed floating or crawling pegs (see Ilzetzki et al., 2011 and Appendix Table A2 ). To capture possible effects of exogenous exchange rate variations from the US dollar against the euro, 18 two variables are added: on the one hand, the nominal exchange rate of the 15 Cape Verde since 1998 and Sao Tome & Principe since 2009 have signed an agreement with Portugal that strengthens the parity of their currency against the euro. 16 Democratic Republic of Congo also experienced hyperinflation which was however less important than the nominal depreciation of its currency, leading thus a strong real depreciation. 17 Zimbabwe is excluded because of lack of data. 18 We are grateful to the referee for the suggestion. euro relative to the US dollar as its variations may influence the nominal bilateral exchange rate between African currencies and the renminbi whatever the exchange regime of the African countries is; on the other hand, an euro appreciation dummy variable (which is the product of the euro pegging dummy variable multiplied by a dummy variable equal to one for the 2003-2008 period of the euro appreciation relative to the dollar in nominal terms) to capture the specific effect on the currencies pegged to the euro. Finally, to check if the large real exchange rate variations shown in Figure 4 are largely driven by the inflation differentials or by the exchange rate regimes chosen by African countries, we add a dummy variable for African countries which are equal to 1 if the countries met hyperinflation 19 and zero for the rest. The other variables are the traditional ones used to explain real exchange rate changes. Many African countries are large exporters of raw materials, what is a factor of real appreciation and potentially of a 'Dutch disease' phenomenon, i.e., an appreciation detrimental to the exports of manufactured goods. This seems the case (see Figure 3) for the currencies of Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo and Gabon (listed by decreasing level of real appreciation), which are the main Sub-Saharan African oil exporters, as well as Zambia, which exports copper and cobalt. Two countries have been affected less: Botswana, which exports minerals (notably diamonds), and Mauritania, which exports iron ore. An exception is Algeria whose real exchange rate appreciated from 2000 to 2008, but then depreciated by 13% from 2008 to 2011, due to the nominal depreciation of 19% of the Algerian dinar versus the renminbi. Two variables may capture the effect of raw material exports on 19 After simulations, the countries are considered as suffering from hyperinflation when their annual inflation is superior to 110% per year, which is the threshold from which the dummy variable becomes statistically significant. It concerns Democratic Republic Congo and Angola for 2000 and 2001.
real exchange rates: a dummy variable representing the exporting countries of oils and metals (a volume effect), and the international terms of trade (a price effect). Aid flows are another source of real appreciation. 20 To separate the specific effects of China's policies, we make a difference between the activities of China's economic co-operation 21 and the official development aid (ODA) of the main international donors 22 (the 23 DAC industrial countries, the multilateral institutions and the 22 non-DAC countries 23 ). Finally, the Balassa-Samuelson effect is captured by the ratio of per capita real GDP of each African country relative to China in log form.
Econometric estimations
The impact of the above factors on real exchange rates can be modelled in logarithms as follows:
where ER represents the real bilateral exchange rates of African countries relative to China; a rise of the indicator means an appreciation of the exchange rate of African countries. D€ and D$ are two dummy variables with values equal to 1 when the currencies are pegged on the one hand to the euro, on the other hand to the dollar or the South-African rand, and 0 for the others. D$€ is the dummy variable of the euro appreciation relative to the dollar, which is the product of the euro pegging variable multiplied by the dummy variable of the euro nominal appreciation versus the dollar (equal to one if appreciation and zero for the rest). NR$€ is nominal exchange rate of the euro versus the dollar (a rise means the appreciation of the euro relative to the dollar); INF is inflation dummy variable for African countries and for the years (equal to one if high inflation and zero for the rest). CEC is the amount of China's economic co-operation in constant terms. ODA is the official development aid of all international donors in constant terms. OIL is a dummy variable with value equal to 1 for oil and/or metal producers. TOT is international terms of trade for African countries. YK is the ratio of real GDP per capita of African countries relative to China in log form. The signs of all variables are expected to be positive. As all the variables are expressed in logarithms except for dummy variables, the coefficients of the non-dummy variables represent the elasticity of the real exchange rate for these variables. The econometric tests and methods are the same as previously mentioned. As all variables are stationary at an absolute level (see Appendix Table A3 for the unit-root results), the estimations of equation (4) are pertinent. Three disturbance terms (time-fixed and 20 Private inflows are less likely to cause a real appreciation as they are generally compensated by imports and implicated in tradable activities, while aid finances more the demand for domestic goods. Foreign direct investments appear insignificant in our estimation. 21 China has economic co-operation in all African countries, but concentrates its activities in raw material producers such as Angola, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, etc. In 2011, these four countries received more than a half total economic co-operation in Africa. 22 However, the two concepts are not identical as China does not participate in OECD and DAC (Development Assistance Committee). For a definition of China's Economic co-operation, see above the text and footnote 8. 23 China is not among the 22 non-DAC countries.
China's African Financial Engagement, RER and Trade between China and Africa countries-fixed effects and error terms) are added as previously. The presence of individual effects is particularly relevant, because the levels of the real exchange rates are not comparable from one country to another, since the base year (2000) can correspond to a bigger or smaller overvaluation or undervaluation depending on the country. The random and the HausmanTaylor models of estimation are preferred to the fixed effects because they permit retention of the 'peg to euro', and oil or metal dummy variable which do not vary with time.
Another way to take different initial levels of overvaluation or undervaluation into account is to estimate a cross-country regression for the change in the log of the real bilateral rate for 2000-2011 against the changes in the logs of terms of trade, of African GDP per capita relative to China, of China's economic co-operation and of ODA from all international donors, as well as the dummy variables of exchange rate regimes, of high inflation countries and oil and/ or metal producers 24 Table 4 shows that the results of three kinds of estimation (fixed effects, random effects and Hausman-Taylor models) are very similar. Concerning the panel data estimation, all variables are significant except for the ratio of GDP per capita of African countries relative to China when time-fixed effect is taken into account. The Balassa-Samuelson effect seems to be captured by the time-fixed effect as the relative GDP per capita is statistically significant when time-fixed effect is not included in the estimations. The real appreciation of African currencies is effectively explained by the exchange rate regimes that African countries have chosen and by the flows of foreign currencies due to raw material exports or international co-operation ( potentially 'Dutch disease' phenomenon).
Pegged African currencies to the euro or to the dollar experience a real appreciation against the renminbi contrary to floating currencies; the appreciation is almost three times higher for the euro pegged currencies than for the US dollar and South-African rand pegged currencies (according to the positive coefficients of the dummies D€ and D$, i.e., 0.22 and 0.08, respectively). This appreciation is globally increased during the period when the euro is appreciating versus the dollar ( positive coefficient of NR$€); it is even more important for the African countries which peg their currencies to the euro; these countries suffer specifically from the appreciation of this currency (with a positive coefficient of the dummy D$€ of 0.11).
The coefficients for the oil/metal dummy variable, for the international terms of trade, for aid from industrial countries and for China's economic co-operation activities are also all positive as expected. The elasticity of the real exchange rate of African countries to the aid from international donors is 0.04, which is higher than that relative to China's economic cooperation at 0.02. Both are moderate. However, because the rate of growth of China's economic co-operation is high (on average 36% per year, see Table 2 ), the impact of this variable is economically significant. On average, China's co-operation increases African real exchange rates by 0.72% (36% × 0.02) per year, i.e., 8.2% over the period 2000-2011, thus explaining 20% (8.2/42) of the 42% real appreciation of African currencies. The impact is much higher for the countries, which receive the biggest amounts of China's economic co-operation. This is the case for Angola where China's economic co-operation has increased on average by 123% per year, which has stimulated the real exchange rate to increase by 2.46% (123% × 0.02) per year, i.e., 30.6% over the period 2000-2011. China's economic co-operation accounted for 20.4% (30.6/150) of the 150% real appreciation of the Angolan Kwanza relative to the renminbi.
24 We thank Prof. Michael Bleaney for the suggestion. Notes: Nominal exchange rate $/€ is dropped when the time-fixed effect is added. In Hausman-Taylor estimations, currencies pegged to the dollar or the South-African rand, currencies pegged to the euro, nominal exchange rate $/€, dummy of the Euro appreciation relative to the dollar, terms of trade and the oil dummy variable are considered as exogenous. The others (China's economic co-operation, ODA of all international donors and ratio of GDP per capita of African countries relative to China and high inflation dummy variable) are taken as endogenous. T-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity by the White procedure are reported in parentheses. *, **and ***indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels of confidence, respectively.
With respect to the results of the cross-country data, all the variables, except for the oil dummy variable and the ratio of the GDP per capita of African countries relative to China, are statistically significant. The results are similar to those for the panel data.
Conclusion
This study contributes to the literature by estimating the role of bilateral real exchange rates in China/Africa trade, and the determinants of these real exchange rates over the period 2000-2011. The study shows that the bilateral real exchange rates between China and African countries have a significant impact on China's exports to these countries. It also shows that China's financial assistance (economic co-operation) to African countries tends to favour its exports, which are on the contrary slowed down by the SEZs created by China in Africa. As is the case for other countries, China tends to export its manufactured goods to those African countries that have lower transaction costs. However, China tends to import from those countries, which have bad governance and receive China's direct investments. These imports are not affected by the bilateral real exchange rates.
The study also suggests that the real appreciation of African currencies relative to the renminbi can be explained by the pegging of some African currencies to major world currencies (in particular to the euro, which is overvalued relative to the renminbi), by the amount of exports of raw materials (oil and metal), by the favourable international terms of trade of African countries, by the amounts of financial assistance from international donors and from China as well as by the difference in productivity between African countries and China.
The African countries that are abundantly endowed with natural resources, notably oil and minerals in Sub-Saharan Africa, have profited from strong growth in their exports of these products to China. In Africa, Chinese economic co-operation has improved the infrastructure. Both raw material exports and Chinese economic co-operation are certainly immediate sources of economic growth for Africa. However, in the long term, they may become a disadvantage for African countries when they want to diversify their production towards manufactured goods. Raw material exports and Chinese economic co-operation contribute to the real appreciation of African currencies relative to the renminbi, which increases China's exports of manufactured goods competing with domestic production.
These conclusions have significant political implications for some African countries, as we have seen that diverse are the evolutions of the African bilateral real exchange rates relative to China. First, many Sub-Saharan African countries peg their currency to the euro, which is historically justified by their strong commercial and financial relationships with Europe, and by the agreements with France in the framework of the Franc Zone. But as China de facto pegs the renminbi to the US dollar (in spite of some revaluation of its currency versus the US dollar), and as the dollar is undervalued relative to the euro, these African countries are handicapped when competing against China's manufactured goods. It is also the case but in a lesser extent for countries pegging their currency to the US dollar. The world financial equilibrium and the relative position of the main currencies (dollar, euro and renminbi) are very important for the development of African countries. However, Africa is marginalised in international forums. With the exception of South Africa (whose level of development is not representative of the other Sub-Saharan African countries, and whose currency has not appreciated much versus the renminbi during the last decade), African countries do not participate in the G20, the composition of which gives an excessive weight to industrial and emerging nations. It would be desirable for 'Least Development Countries', which are mainly African countries, to participate more actively in world governance.
Second, because foreign aid inflows are a factor in currency appreciation (and potentially of 'Dutch disease'), it is very important that they contribute to increasing productivity, especially in the tradable goods sector. This is a concern for the countries that receive much foreign aid per capita, which are generally small low-income countries, as for instance Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, which, respectively, received US$ 491 $and 446 $per capita from international aid in 2011, as well as Equatorial Guinea, Botswana and Angola in which China's economic co-operation represented US$ 2501$, 771$ and 323$ per capita in the same year.
Third, a risk of overvaluation of the exchange rate similarly exists for natural resources exports, where responsibility lies mainly with African governments. The opposite extreme cases of Angola whose currency was pegged to the dollar for the period from 2004 to 2009 and which met real appreciation against the renminbi and of Democratic Republic of Congo whose currency is floating and met real depreciation evidence the difficulty in combining large oil or metal exports with a fixed exchange rate regime. 
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